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The Chernobyl Accident: A Case
Study In International Law*
Regulating State Responsibility for
Transboundary Nuclear Pollution**
Lmda A. Malone***
On Saturday April 26, 1986, at 1:23 a.m., the worst acCident m
the htstory of nuclear energy 1 began at the Chernobyl Nuclear
Power Plant. 2 In the fourth and newest reactor at the site, a cnsts
of potentially catastroph1c proport1on started w1th a masstve loss
of coolant m the reactor's core. 3 The world did not know for
months the precise sequence of events. The Chernobyl reactor
was a graphite reactor generally considered to be an outmoded
type of reactor which has been largely abandoned outstde the Soviet Umon. 4 The prevalent concern over use of graphite reactors
even pnor to Chernobyl was m large part due to a fire which oc
An abbreviated vers10n of th1s article was presented on September 30, 1986, at the
Annual Meetmg m Plymouth, England of the Agncultural Law AssoCiation of Great Bntam
and the ComJte Europeen de Drmt Rural.
• • Trans boundary pollution may be defined as substance that ongmates m one
nauon, moves through natural medium such as a1r or water, and 1mposes harmful effects
m another nation. Comment, Ltability for Tran.mallonal Pollution Ans1ng from Offshore Oil
Development: A Methodolog~cal Approach, 10 EcoLOGY L. Q 641 (1983). It has been
suggested that pollution should not be defined to mclude any change m the environment,
but to encompass "a threshold level of damage of interference whJCh IS legally s1gnificant.
Sponger, Towards Meanmgful Concept of Pollut1on m InternatiOnal Law, 26 INT'L & CoMP L.
Q 531, 532 (1977).
••• AssoCiate Professor of Law, Umvers1ty of Arkansas Law School, Fayetteville; B.A.
1975, Vassar College; J.D. 1978, Duke Law School; L.L.M. 1984, Umv. of Illino1s College
of Law.
I. After VISiting the Chernobyl plant, Hans Blix, Head of the International Atom1c Energy Agency, stated, "It' clear that the radioactive consequences of th1s acCident also are
more senous than any acCJdent so far, and also that radioactive releases to the atmosphere
are far more senous. N.Y. Times, May 10, 1986, at AI, A4, col. 3. As of May 15, nme
people had died and 299 others had been hospitalized for radiation s1ckness. Withm 19
mile radius, 84,000 people were evacuated, some not until week after the acc1dent. A
Fearful Flight from Chernobyl, NEWSWEEK, May 19, 1986, at 36.
2. Barnathan & Strasser, Meltdown, NEWSWEEK, May 12, 1986, at 22 (heremafter
Meltdown].
3. /d. at 23.
4. /d.
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curred m 1957 at Bntam s Windscale graphite reactor 5 However the acknowledged advantage from use of a graphite reactor
IS Its utility m the productiOn of weapons-grade plutomum for nuclear weapons.6
The Chernobyl reactor had a rudimentary emergency backup
system. More significantly It had no contamment structure to
control radioactive releases m the event of an accident. 7 The
emergmg scientific consensus as to what occurred IS this: on Fnday April 25, for reasons mitially explamed by one Soviet official
as "human error" 8 there was a failure m the water cooling system
for the uramum fuel rods surrounded by graphite blocks. 9 At a
press conference m Moscow the Soviet Umon revealed that the
accident was the result of an expenment designed to determme
how long the reactor would contmue to produce electriCity m the
event of an unexpected power cutoff. 10 TechmCians deliberately
lowered the reactor s power level and, most Importantly shut off
the plant's emergency cooling system. 11 The operators, however
contmued to let the reactor run with the emergency cooling system turned off--a vwlatwn of Soviet safety protocols. 12 As a re
sult, radioactive xenon gas built up and destabilized the fuel
core.I 3 Compounding their error the techmcians removed all
but a few of the control rods and disconnected the automatic rod
control system. 14 From this pomt, the techmcians proceeded to
go through a senes of steps to counterbalance the destabilized
reactor until they eventually blocked the emergency water and
pressure level wammg signals (that might have tnggered an automatic shutdown for safety reasons) so that they could proceed
with the expenment. 15 Without proper coolant, the fuel rods
were heated to a temperature of 3,500 degrees Fahrenheit, warpmg the zircomum alloy around the fuel assemblies. 16 At approxi5. /d.
6. /d. For further discusston of the graphue reactor, see Sullivan, Calamzty Highlights Old
Reactor- Deszgn Debate, N.Y. Times, May 1, 1986, at All, col. I.
7 Meltdown, supra note 2, at 23.
8. /d., N.Y Times, May 3, 1986, at A6, col. 3.
9. Meltdown, supra note 2, al 23.
10. Anatomy of Catastrophe, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 1, 1986, at 26 [heremafter Anatomy].
11. /d.
12. /d. at 27
13. /d.
14. /d.
15. /d.
16. N.Y. Times, May I, 1986, at All, cols. 1-2.
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mately 5,100 degrees the uramum-oxide fuel Itself begms to
melt. 17 Before this pomt, the reactor ordinarily would have
flooded Itself with water and shut down automatically but this did
not occur 18
At 1:23 a.m. on April 26, nevertheless, the expenment was begun.l9 The operators shut off valves to prevent steam from
reachmg the turbme umt they wanted to test. 20 Before domg so,
they had bypassed the system that would have automatically made
the reactor shut down.2 1 Withm seconds there was a heat and
steam buildup m the core.22 Withm forty seconds, the shift manager tned to stop the reactor but It was too late. 23 The remammg water m the system turned mto steam and reacted wtth the
graphite, fuel and zircomum to produce flammable hydrogen
methane and carbon monoxide. 24 On Saturday April 26, at 1:23
a.m., there were two gas explosiOns, blowmg the roof off the reac
tor building. 25 The resultant fire (with 100 foot high flames due
to the lack of contamment26 from the then bummg graphite
bncks), burned m the open air and released a cloud of smoke,
gas, and radiat10n. 27 The fire would contmue to bum or smolder
for at least a week. 28 On Monday a worker at a nuclear power
plant m Sweden walked past a radiatiOn detector and set off Its
alarm. 29 After checkmg on Its own plant, Sweden discovered
momtonng statiOns throughout the country were registenng unusually high levels of radiatiOn. 30 The radiation from Chemobyl
that mittally swept over Norway Finland, and Sweden on April
17 The Chernobyl Syndrome, NEWSWEEK, May 12, 1986, at 23 [heremafter Syndrome].
There IS disagreement over whether meltdown m the sense of penetration of the layer of
concrete underneath the reactor occurred, but It was announced that the Soviet techmcians were trymg to entomb the building m concrete, lead, and boron, which would mclude laymg concrete underneath the reactor. A Fearful Flight, NEWSWEEK, May 19, 1986, at
37-38.
18. Syndrome, supra note 17 at 23.
19. Anatomy, supra note 10, at 27
20. !d.
21. !d.
22. !d. at 28.
23. !d.
24. Syndrome, supra note 17 at 23.
25. Anatomy, supra note 10, at 28.
26. N.Y. Times, May 6, 1986, at AI, col. 3.
27 !d. at A6.
28. N.Y. Times, May 3, 1986, at AI, cols. 4 & 6.
29. Syndrome, supra note 17 at 24.
30. !d.
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28th was brought mto the heart of Europe by shifung wmds on
May 5th. 3 I By May 6, small amounts of radiatiOn had traveled
across the Pacific Ocean and over much of the Umted States. 32
Pravda reported that helicopters were dumpmg sand, clay lead
and boron mto the reactor to contam radioactivity 33 Diplomats
were withdrawn from Moscow 34 tounsts returned home, 35
angmshed mothers m Poland fought over doses of Iodine for
their children, sales of milk from grass-fed cows were banned, 36
and the European Commumty banned Imports of fresh food
products from Eastern EuropeP As of the end ofjuly the Soviet
Umon had 200 people suffermg from acute radiatiOn sickness and
28 people dead as a result of the acCident. 38 Surrounding the
Chernobyl plant there was approximately 385 square miles that
had been contammated and possibly a nearby water basm. 39
Outside of the Soviet Umon, European farmers sus tamed millions
of dollars of damage from crops, livestock and dairy and egg
products that could not be sold as a result of potential or actual
contammat10n. 40
The Chernobyl mCident bnngs mto focus the madequacy of domestiC law to protect the global environment. PollutiOn and radiatiOn do not recogmze national boundanes. Any legal recourse
for the damage mfiicted by the accident must come from mternationallaw 4 I As one notable mternatiOnallaw scholar has asked,
"Should these decisions of such consequence for the future of the
world and for humamty as a whole be left withm the provmce of
natiOnal JUrisdictiOnal determmat10n?" 42

N.Y. Times, May 6, 1986, at A6, col. 1.
/d. at col. 3.
N.Y. Times, May 8, 1986, at AIO, col. I.
Syndrome, supra note 17 at 29.
/d.
N.Y. Times, May 1, 1986, at All, col. 3.
N.Y. Times, May 8, 1986, at AIO, col. 4.
Chernobyl' Goal, NEWSWEEK, July 28, 1986, at 33.
/d.
Washmgton Post, June 8, 1986, at AI, col. 4.
On mternauonal environmental law generally, see TECLAFF & UrroN, INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONNMENTAL LAw (1974) and A. SPRINGER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAw OF POLLUTION
(1983).
42. Falk, The Global Envzronment and Internatzonal Law: Challenge and Response, 23 KAN. L.
REV. 385, 403 (1975).

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37
38.
39.
40.
41.
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After the Chernobyl acCident, the Soviet Umon was
threatened wtth a flurry of littgatwn. 43 But potential and actual
litigants soon discovered that although the Soviet Umon was cer
tamly responsible for damage from the the acCident under mter
natiOnal law recovery was uncertam and enforcement virtually
Impossible. A global commumty that had often tgnored mternatwnal law was suddenly calling for Its expansiOn and enforcement. The commumty asked, why are there not a global safety
standards for nuclear reactors? Why are there not global early
warnmg systems for nuclear acCidents? It asked why the Soviet
Umon not obligated to pay compensatiOn for the damage caused
by what the Soviet Umon Itself acknowledged was negligent oper
atiOn of a nuclear reactor';)
Conflicts over transboundary pollution are not recent developments. The semmal case m mternattonallaw governmg recovery
for transboundary pollutiOn was decided m 1941 and was a har
bmger of the present controversy over aCid ram. 44 InternatiOnal
law does provide rules of substantive liability for transboundary
pollutiOn but enforcement Is hampered by and dependent upon
state cooperatiOn. Utilizmg the Chernobyl acCident as a case
study this article will focus on current mternatwnal law governmg transboundary nuclear pollution, defiCienCies m the cur
43. On May 15, the European Parliament called for the Sov1et Umon to pay compensation to Western European farmers. Xinhera General Overseas Serv1ce, May 16, 1986. On
July 12, 1986, Oregon declared 1t would bill the Sov1et Umon $73,000.00 for the cost of
radiation tests on a1r, water and vegetables. Los Angeles Times, July 12, 1986, at Al6, col.
l. The Bntlsh Agnculture Mimster sa1d that consideration was bemg given to seekmg
compensation, but there was hesitation because 1t m1ght set precedent for cla1ms agamst
Great Bntam by Scandinavian countnes for aCid ram damage. Umted Press International,
June 30, 1986, AM cycle. Swedish offiCJals studied the possibility of sumg Moscow for
damages but sa1d It was unlikely they could do so. 1986 Reuters North European ServiCe,
May 23, 1986 AM cycle. The West German government demanded that the Soviet Umon
pay damages to the1r farmers because 1t was reqmred to pay Its farmers for damages under
Its own domestic law; /d. A Belgian farmer declared he was gomg to sue the Soviet Umon
h1mselffor $1500.00. Reuters North European Serv1ce, May 13, 1986, AM cycle. A Dutch
msurance company h1red the International Legal Institute m the Hague to determme
whether smt could be brought under Dutch, Sov1et or mternatlonallaw, and farmers m
Italy and Austna urged the1r governments to bnng smts for agncultural damage. Associated Press, May 9, 1986, AM cycle. An Italian farmer sued the Sov1et Umon for $730.00 m
damages man Italian court. Umted Press International, May 7 1986, PM cycle. Farmers
m Northern England asked for compensation for lambs that could not be slaughtered and
sold. Reuters North European Serv1ce, June 30, 1986, AM cycle.
44. For an analysis of recent mternatlonal efforts to curb ac1d ram, see LaBastille,lnternaltonal Acui Test, SIERRA, May-June 1986, at 51.
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rent system, and necessary reforms to the system m light of
"Chernobyl"

I.

LIABILITY FoR TRANSBOUNDARY PoLLUTION UNDER
AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL

CusTOM

LAw

Damages from Chernobyl, direct and mdirect, are difficult to
quanttfy m monetary terms. The European Economic Commumty s tmport ban on Polish food tmports cost Poland one million
dollars m May of 1986 alone. 45 Austnan farmers m June asked
for nearly 5.5 million dollars m compensation from thetr own
government for tts failure to exerctse enforcement control over
vegetable sales. 46 In May Italian farmers clatmed they were losmg 3.3 million dollars a day and the West German government
estimated tts damages rntght be m the billions. 47
Any analysts of the Sovtet Umon s liability necessarily begms
wtth the landmark Trail Smelter case. In the Trail Smelter case, 48
Canada and the Umted States, pursuant to a treaty specifically
drafted for resolutton of the conflict, submitted a dispute concermng emtsswns from a smelter near Trail, Canada for arbttratton.49 The Umted States contended that sulfur dioxtde
emtsstons from the smelter were crossmg the border and damagmg forests vttal to the lumber mdustry m the state of Washmgton50 (sulfur dioxtde ts now generally acknowledged as the
pollutant pnmarily responsible for the harmful effects of so-called
aod ram). 51 In a 1938 mtenm declSlon, the arbttratwn tribunal
concluded that there was InJury to the Washmgton forests and
that the emtsstons from the Trail Smelter were the cause of that
InJury 52 The tribunal then turned to the tssue of damages for
that InJUry 53 In assessmg damages, the tribunal refused to allow
damages for the wrong done the Umted States by Canada s vtola45.
46.
47
48.
1905,
49.
50.
51.

Reuters North European Servtce, May 13, 1986, AM cycle.
Reuters North European Servtce, June 28, 1986, AM cycle.
Assoctated Press, May 9, 1986.
Trail Smelter Case (U. S. v. Canada), Aribttral Tribunal, 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards
1938 (1949).
/d. at 1917
ld. at 1922.
See SWEDEN'S CASE STUDY FOR THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN

ENVIRONMENT, SUPPORTING STUDIES TO AIR POLLUTION ACROSS NATIONAL BoUNDARIES:
THE IMPAGT ON THE ENVIRONMENT OF SULFUR IN THE AIR AND PRECIPITATION

52. 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards, at 1924.
53. /d. at 1932.

(1972).

Chemobyl
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tiOn of Its sovereigmty 54 The fact that pollutants from Canada
had crossed the Umted States border did not tngger liability for
damages without a showmg of matenal damage. In additiOn to
those damages whtch were awarded for the InJUnes to the forests
sustamed by the Umted States m the mtenm declSlon, the tribunal ordered the Trail Smelter to refram from causmg further
damage until Issuance of a final deCisiOn. 55 That final decisiOn
was reported three years later and focused on whether the Canadian Trail Smelter should be reqmred to refram from causmg
damage m the future to the State of Washmgton. 5 6
The tribunal concluded that there was no need to determme
whether Umted States domestic law or mternat10nallaw would be
applied because the law followed m the Umted States m dealing
wtth quasi-sovereign nghts of states Withm the Umted States m
regulatmg air pollutiOn, while more defimte than mternat10nal
law was m conformity with "the general rules of mternat10nal
law " 57 Unable to find any precedents from mternat10nal tribunals addressmg air or water pollutiOn, the tribunal turned to deCIsiOns of the Umted States Supreme Court that were premised on
the federal common law of nUisance. 5 8 From these cases adjudicatmg mterstate conflicts over air and water pollutiOn, the tribunal concluded that "under the pnnciples of mternat10nal law as
well as of the law of the Umted States, no State has the nght to
use or permit the use of Its territory m such a manner as to cause
mJury by fumes m or to the tern tory of another or the properties
or persons therem, when the case IS of senous consequences and
the InJUry Is established by clear and convmcmg evidence." 59 Ac
cordingly the tribunal found that Canada was legally responsible
for the InJunous actions of the smelter under mternat10nal law
and the smelter was reqmred to refram from causmg any further
damage to the Umted States. 60
Two fundamental prmciples of mternat10nallaw may be drawn
from the Trail Smelter declSlon. First, the Tribunal held that a
state IS not entitled to legal relief merely upon a showmg that
54.
55.
56.
57
58.
59.
60.

Jd.
/d.
ld.
/d.
Id.
Jd.
/d.

at
at
at
at

1932-33.
1934.
1962.
1964.

at 1965.
at 1948, 1966.
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emissions or releases from one country have crossed mto the ter
ntory of another state. There must be a showmg of matenal damage over and above a vwlat10n of sovereigmty 61 Secondly a state
may be held responsible for pollut10n by pnvate parties w1thm Its
terntory if such polluuon results m demonstrable lllJUf)' to another state or to the property or persons therem.
Support for such a state obligatiOn may also be found outside
the pollution context m the InternatiOnal Court of Justice deCISion m the Coifu Channel case. 62 In that case, the Umted Kingdom
sued Albama for physiCal damage and loss of life sus tamed by two
Bntish warships which ran mto moored contact mmes m the
Straits of Corfu. 63 Although Albama was not found to have lam
the mmes, the Court determmed that the laymg of the mmefield
could not have been done Without Albama s knowledge. 64 Holdmg Albama responsible for damages, the Court stated:
The obligations mcumbent upon the Albaman authonties consisted m notifymg, for the benefit of shippmg m general, the
existence of a mmefield m Albaman terntonal waters and m
warnmg the approachmg Bntish warships of the Immment danger to which the mmefield exposed them. Such obligations are
based not on the Hague Convention of 1907 No. VIII, which Is
applicable m time of war but on certam general and well-recogmzed pnnCiples, namely· elimmatmg consideratiOns of humanIty even more exactmg m peace than m war; the pnnCiple of
the freedom mantime navigation and every State s obligatiOn
not to allow knowmgly 1ts temtory to be used for acts contrary

to the nghts of other States. 65
More than thirty years ago, both these cases recognized the rule
of mternauonal law which says that permittmg extraterntonal
damage from mtrastate activity which IS m and of Itselflawful (i.e.,
manufactunng, or operatmg nuclear power plants) may render
the state responsible for the damage mflicted. In additiOn, PnnCIple 21 of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment
m 1972 provided that states have an obligatiOn to ensure that ac
tiVIties occurrmg Withm their JUrisdictiOn or under their control

61. For an analysis emphasizmg the limited recovery permitted by the Trail Smelter
case, see Rubm, Pollution by Analogy: The Trail Smelter Arbttratwn, 50 OR. L. REv. 259 (1971).
62. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Albama), 1949 I.CJ. 4.
63. /d.
64. !d. at 20-22.
65. !d. at 22-23.
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do not cause harm m areas beyond their temtory 66 Principle 22
reqmres states to cooperate m broadenmg liability for environmental damage. 67 As a result, the International Law Commission
has smce been studymg proposals to extend national liability to
cover InJUries caused by acts lawful per se. 6 s
This reJeCtiOn of an absolute VIew of sovereignity69-that there
are limitations on the lawful activities which may be conducted
withm a state s own territory-may be characterized as the doc
tnne of "abuse of rights" or the doctrine of "good neighborliness." The source of these doctrines appear to stem from
customary mtematiOnallaw general prinCiples oflaw (precepts of
law recognized by most civilized nations) or more fundamentally
from general doctrines of equity (ex aequo et bono). 70 Under mter
66. Stockholm Declaration of the Umted Natwns Conference on the Human Env1ronment, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.48/l4 (1972), repnnted m, II I.L.M. 1416 (1972).
67 /d. at 1420.
68. See, e.g., Second Report on lnternat1onal Lzability for hyunous Consequences Ansmg Out of
Acts Not Prohib1ted by International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN 4/346, Add. I and Add. 2 (1981).
See also Cooperatwn m the Field of the Env1ronment Concernmg Natural Resources Shared by Two or
More States, G.A. Res. 3129, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 48-49, U.N. Doc. A/9030
( 1973); Draft Pnnoples of Conduct m the Field of the Environment for the Guulance of States m the
Conservation and Harmomous Utilization of Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States, Report
of the Intergovernmental Workmg Group of Experts on Natural Resources Shared by Two or More
States on the Work of its Fifth Sess1on, U.N. Doc. UNEP/IG.l2/2, at 9 (1978), and OECD Council
Recommendation on Pnnoples Govern1ng Transfront~er Pollut1on, 14 I.L.M. 234 (1975) (requmng
pnor nouce and mfonnauon about actions affectmg the shared resource); Sm1th, The
OECD Approach to the Solut1on of the Transfront~er Pollut1on Problem m ENVIRONMENTAL LAw,
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE ASPECTS, A SYMPOSIUM (1976); see, e.g., Convention on

Long Range Transboundary A1r Polluuon, Nov. 13, 1979, E/ECE/1010, T.I.A.S. No.
1054; Wetstone and Rosencranz, Transboundary Air Pollution m Europe: A Survey of Nat1onal
Responses, 9 CoLUM.J. ENVTL. L. I (1983).
69. Traditionally states have had absolute sovereignty over use of natural resources
w1thm the1r temtones. Permanent Soverezgnty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 3171, 28 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973); Charter of Econom1c Rights and Dutus
of States, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31), at 51; Stockholm Declaration of the
Umted Nat1ons Conference on the Human Environment, supra note 66; see also Declamt1on on the
Establishment of New International Economic Order G.A. Res. 320l(S-VI), 6th Spec1al SessiOn
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. l) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1954) and Programme of Actwn on the
Establishment of New International EconomiC Order, G.A. Res. 3202(S-VI), 6th SpeCial Sess1on
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1), U.N. Doc. A/559 (1954).
70. The accepted sources of internauonallaw are set forth m the Statute of the International Court ofjusuce, 1945, art. 38(1), 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 933:
(l) The Court, whose funcuon 1s to dec1de m accordance with mtemauonallaw such
disputes as are submitted to 1t, shall apply.
(a) mternauonal convenuons, whether general or particular, establishmg rules expressly recogn1zed by the conceding states;
(b) mternauonal custom, as ev1dence of general pracuce accepted as law;
(c) the general pnnc1ples of law recognized by Civilized nauons;

212

COLUMBIA jOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL

LAw [Vol. 12:203

national law the most controversial of these two doctrmes Is the
concept of good neighborliness embodied m the latm maxim, szc
utere tuo ut abenum non laedus: use your own property so that It will
not lnJure others.7 1
By havmg recogmzed the doctrme of good neighborliness, the
Trail Smelter case mevitably raised many more questiOns than It
answered. In analyzmg the mterrelatiOnship between terntonal
sovereignity and transnatiOnal pollutiOn, acknowledgement of the
doctrme fails to adequately delineate the parameters of state obligatiOn. 72 When are the pollutmg actiOns of pnvate parties the
responsibility of the State? How must causatiOn between action
and InJury be established? Can state responsibility be established
without fault, I.e., based on stnct liability for ultrahazardous activIties? For what types of InJUries may damages be rcovered? Is
InJunctive relief, as well as damages, appropnate relief under InternatiOnal law;>
II.

FAULT STRICT LIABIL1Y AND THE PARAMETERS
OF GOOD NEIGHBORLINESS

The doctrme of good neighborliness, as a general prmCiple of
law recogmzed by civilized nations, draws from traditiOnal AngloAmencan theones of tort law Tort law governmg land use, however may be predicated on fault-I.e., trespass, nmsance, negligence or mtentiOnal torts-or on stnct liability for ultrahazardous
activity 73 Can a State s responsibility for pollutiOn under mter
national law be predicated only on fault, or may there be stnct
liability for pollutiOn damages created by ultrahzardous actiVIties,
such as the operatiOn of a nuclear power plant?
(d) subject to the proviSions of Article 59, JUdicial deciSions and the teachmgs of
the most h1ghly qualified publicists of the vanous nations, as subsidiary means;
(2) Th1s provisiOn shall not preJudice the power of the Court to decide case ex aequo
et bono, if the parties agree thereto.
Although the Trail Smelter case was decided pursuant to treaty for resolution of that dis·
pute, the Tribunal based Its determmauon of substantive liability on sources of 1ntema·
uonal law aside from the treaty Itself. Article IV of the Compromise govemmg the case
authonzed the Tribunal to apply "the law and practice followed m dealing With cognate
questiOns m the Umted States of Amenca as well as mtemauonallaw and practice. 3 R.
Int'l Arb. Awards at 1908.
71. Elkmd, Footnote to the Nuclear Tests Cases: Abuse of Right - A Blind Alley for Envrronmentalists, 9 YAND.j. TRANSNAT'L. L. 57 90-91 (1976).
72. Hand!, Temtonal Soverezgnty and the Problem ofTransnatzonal Pollutron, 69 AM.J. INT'L L.
50 (1975).
73. See, e.g., PROSSER AND KEATON ON TORTS, §§ 13-15, 28-34, 86-91 (5th ed. 1984).
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As early as 1966, C. WilfredJenks, Citmg treaties governmg aviation hazards and nuclear damage,' 4 argued that there was "a
growmg number of significant exceptiOns to the alleged pnnCiple
that liability m mternat1onal law rests exclus1vely upon fault."
Jenks, however went on to questiOn whether such treaty obligations embody a nasCient rule of customary mternatwnal law Imposmg stnct liability for ultrahazardous actiVIty or exceptions by
treaty to an established custom requmng fault for state liability 75
Focusmg on treaties governmg nuclear damage, Jenks set forth
the followmg pnnCiples for state responsibility·
The pnnCiple that liability for nuclear damage IS "absolute" 1s
generally accepted but the expressiOn 1s somewhat m1sleading
m that 1t does not exclude the possibility of exceptiOns. The
pnnCiple that such liability by reason of 1ts potential scale,
must rest upon a responsible operator who remams responsible while nuclear matenal 1s m the hands of mtermedianes 1s
likew1se generally accepted.

•••

For both pollution and nuclear hazards, 1t 1s the scale of the
possible consequences whiCh converts the ultrahazardous use
of a facility mvolvmg the liability of the operator mto the ultrahazardous use of a terntory mvolvmg the liability of the
76
State. Fundamentally the questiOn 1s of public policy
One commentator also relymg on the general pnnciples of
law has attempted to distmgmsh between the doctnnes of abuse
of nghts and good neighborliness. Pursuant to the doctrme of
good neighborliness, a property owner 1s bound to accept a reasonable amount of nOise, smoke, and other pollution, but when
that mvaswn or trespass exceeds that reasonably necessary then
the InJUred neighbor may seek a legal rememdy to prevent the
mterference, or seek damages. 77 Fault m the form of maliCious or
74. Jenks, Liability for Ultra-Hazardous ActiVIties m International Law, 117 HAGUE RECUEIL
99, 106 (1966-1).
75. Id.
76. /d. at 127 144-45. It should also be noted that the Restatement of Fore•gn Relauons Law has reJeCted absolute liability for environmental damage:
(i) A State 1s obligated to take such measures as may be practicable under the Circumstances to ensure that actlVJtles Wlthm 1ts junsdictlon or control
(a) conform to generally accepted mtematlonal rules and standards for the prevention, reducuon, and control of illjury to the environment of another state or of areas
beyond the limits of natural JUnsdicuon;
(b) are conduted so as not to cause significant InJUry to the environment of another
state or of areas beyond the limns of national JUnsdictlon.
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW§ 601(1) (1983).
77 Elkmd, supra note 71, at 91.
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negligent conduct IS not necessary for liability but Is relevant to
whether or not the mvas10n was reasonable. 78 Abuse of nghts
occurs when activity IS motivated by culpable behavior such as
maliCious mtent or negligence. When a property owner harms his
neighbor by land uses which do not necessarily physically mvade
the neighbor's property or cause an unreasonable mterference,
the only theory for relief IS abuse of nghts predicated on negligence or malioous mtent. 79 Under this formulatiOn of the two
doctnnes, the conclusiOn reached Is that the doctnne of good
neighborliness IS the theory for recovery m the Trail Smelter case
because no showmg of maliciOus mtent or negligence was
made. 80
To summanze bnefly the extant theones of state liability for
transboundary pollutiOn drawmg on custom, general pnnoples of
law and eqmty It may be postulated that:
1. A State has an absolute duty to protect agamst transatiOnal
harm from ultrahazardous activity conducted w1thm Its terntory and IS stnctly liable for any resultant damage.
2. A State has a duty to use reasonable care to protect States
agamst extraterntonal harm from acts committed w1thm Its ter
Itory and failure to do so renders the State responsible for
damage mcurred as a result of negligence or mtentwnal harm.
3. A State IS liable if It permits trans boundary pollutiOn from
w1thm Its terntory to exceed that which Its neighbors may be
reasonably expected to endure.

Of these theones, stnct liability appears to be the most tenuous.
Recovery under the other two theones, however will depend
largely upon a balancmg of factors to determme the reasonableness of the mvas10n or the reasonableness of precautions taken by
the state.
Traditionally under mternauonallaw attributmg state responsibility for the conduct of pnvate parties has focused on whether
there IS a nexus between the state and pnvate conduct sufficient
to render the state ongmally accountable to another state for reparations. Such responsibility has traditiOnally been predicated on
fault. 8 I The Draft Articles on State Responsibility by the Interna78.
79.
80.
81.

/d.
!d.
!d.
See generally Kelson, State Responsibility and the Abnonnally Dangerous Act1v1ty, 13 HARV.
INT'L L. J. 197 199 (1972). The author concludes that: "(I) Where the nsk of harm from
an act1v1ty 1s substantial m either probability or magmtude of harm, and IS transnational m
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uonal Law CommiSSion, for example, largely reflect this traditional focus. 8 2 This limited focus fails to provide cntena for
determmmg when a state IS under an mtemat10nal obligation to
prevent unreasonable nsk of harm to other states through measures regulatmg health, safety and secunty Thus, "admittmg even
the possibility that a state may act when It fails to regulate or control pnvate activity Is to move m a substantive directiOn. " 83 In
short, there has been relatively little refinement of when a state Is
vzcanously liable for acts of persons withm Its borders, and of what
the nature of that liability ts. Yet under the doctnne of good
neighborliness and stnct liability for ultrahazardous actiVIties, the
state Is not only liable If It IS the operator of the plant but IS also
ongznally liable for the harm if an unreasonable Interference or
harm from an ultrahazardous actiVIty IS demonstrated, regardless
of whether fault (in the sense of mtent, recklessness or negligence) IS shown.
character, the State wtthm whose JUnsdicuon the acuvtty ts conducted ts under duty to
prevent such harm as may be caused by the enterpnse; (2) State ts under duty to notify
any other State whtch may be threatened by harm from the abnormally dangerous actlvtues whtch the State permits to be conducted wtthm Its JUnsdicuon; and [less Importantly]
(3) State, failing to prevent harm, shall be ongmally responsible and stnctly liable for the
harm caused by abnormally dangerous acuvtues wtthm Its JUnsdicuon to the rest dents or
property of another State. !d. at 242-43.
82. Draft Artzcles on State Responsibility, 33 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) 187 U.N. Doc.
A/33/10 (1979), repnnted m, [1978] 2 Y.B. INT'L. L. CoMM'N 78, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/l978/Add.l (Part 2).
The relevant article for state responsibility for mtemauonal pollution IS Arttcle 3:
There IS an mtenuonally wrongful act of State when:
(a) conduct conststmg of an action or ommtsswn ts attributable to the State under
mternauonal law; and
(b) that conduct constitutes breach of an mtematwnal obligation of the State.
/d., art. 3. For htstory of the article m relauon to transboundary polluuon, see Hand!,
Temtonal Soveretgnty and the Problem of Transboundary Pollutwn, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 50, 58-60
(1975).
The International Law Commtsston has been studymg the law of state responsibility and
has affirmed the "prmople that States, even when undertakmg acts that mtemauonal law
[does] not prohibit [have] duty to constder the mterests of other States that mtght be
affected. Draft Artzcles on State Responsibility, supra, at 159.
Similarly, the International Law Assooatton m 1982 adopted Rules oflnternational Law
Applicable to Transfront1er Pollution. Article 3(1) declares: "States are m thelr legmmate
activities under an obligation to prevent, abate and control transfrontier pollution to such
an extent that no substantial mJunes caused are m the tern tory of another State. INT'L
LAw Ass'N, REPORT OF THE SIXTIETH CoNNFERENCE HELD AT MoNTREAL 160 (1983). Significantly, the comments to the rules state that the rules merely restate mternationallaw as It
extsts. !d. at 158.
83. Chnstenson, The Doctnne of Attributwn zn State Responsibility, m INT'L LAw OF STATE
RESONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS: SELECTED CONTEMPORARY ISSUES (R. Lillich ed.).
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An additional theory which may be utilized to reqmre States to
abstam from pollutmg the global environment 1s the public trust
doctnne. The concept of protection of the public trust, property
mterests that belong to the public m general, 1s fundamental m
the domestic law of many countnes. It may therefore be considered a general pnnCiple of law under InternatiOnal law 84 The
public trust doctnne IS especially relevant to protectiOn of communal global resources not withm any particular state s Junsdic
tiOn-for example, the high seas. The concept IS ImpliCitly
recogmzed m the Stockholm Declarat10n85 and other resolutiOns
of global environmental policy 86 which supports Its recogmtiOn
as customary InternatiOnal law Along with the responsibility to
abstam from InJurmg the global environment, a state may have an
obligatiOn and standing as parens patnae to obJect to other states'
destructiOn of shared global resources. 8 7
84. See Sax, The Public Trust Doctnne m Natural Resource Law: EffectlvejudiCUJl lnterventzon,
68 MicH. L. REv. 475, 484-85 (1970); Nanda, The Establishment of Internatzonal Standards for
Transnational Environmental Injury, 60 IowA L. REv. 1089, 1118 (1975); and Tiewul, International Law and Nuclear Test Explos1ons on the High Seas, 8 CoRNELL INT'L LJ. 45, 68 (1974).
85. Stockholm DeclaratiOn of the Umted Nat1ons Conference on the Human Environment, supra
note 66. Pnne~ple I states that "[m]an
bears a solemn responsibility to protect and
zmprove the envzronment for present and future generations; PnnCJple 2 provzdes that
"(t]he natural resources of the earth mcluding the azr, water, land, flora and fauna. must
be safeguarded for the benefit of present and future generations through careful planmng
and management. !d. at 1418. See also Sohn, The Stockholm Declaratzon on the Human Environment, 145 HARV INT'L LJ. 423 (1973); The World Charter for Nature, G.A. Res. 37/7 37
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 17 U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1982).
86. See, e.g., Unzted Nat1ons Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF 62/122
(1982), repnnted m 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) and Agreement Governmg the ActiVItii!S of States on the
Moon and other Celest1al Bodies, G.A. Res. 34/68, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 77 U.N.
Doc. A/34/46, art. 11 (declanng certam natural resources to be the common hentage of
mankmd). See also The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780;
Treaty on PnnCJples Govemmg Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, Jan. 27 1967 U.S.-Bntam-Russza, 18 U.S.T 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347 610
U.N.T.S. 205; Resolut1on on the Quest1on of the Reservatron Exclusively for Peaceful Purposes of the
Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, Underlyzng the High Seas Beyond the Lrmrts of
Natzonaljunsdictzons, and the Use ofThl!lr Resources m the Interests of Mankznd, G.A. Res. 2574 D
(XXIV), 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. {No. 30) 11, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1970), repnnted zn, 9 I.L.M.
422 (1970); and Declaration of Pnnctples Governzng the L1m1ts of Natzonaljurndictzon, G.A. Res.
2749 (XXV), 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. {No. 28) 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971), repnnted m, 10
I.L.M. 220 (1971).
87 Wezss, The Planetary Trust: Conservatwn and Intergenerat1onal EqUity, 11 EcOLOGY L.Q
495, 540-41 (1984). The author further contends that not only should the fiduczary obligation to protect "the planetary trust" be regarded as customary mtemauonal law, but
also as JUS cogens, preemptory norm whzch m theory State could enforce before the
International Court of Jusuce. /d. at 540-41. The author concedes, however, that "it zs
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Assummg for the moment that the InJUred state can make the
reqmsite showmg of fault, unreasonable mterference or stnct liability that state, under mtemauonal law will face many of the
hurdles to relief that a tort plamtiff encounters under traditiOnal
Anglo-Amencan tort law The state will have to demonstrate matenal damage, although the full health and socroeconomrc conse
quences of pollutron may not be demonstrable until years after
the ongrnal mfticuon of the InJury It must also be demonstrated
that the damage sustamed was caused by pollution from sources
m the challenged state. 88 Given the mteractiOn of pollutants and
the lengthy latency penod for many diseases, rt may be difficult or
rmpossible to demonstrate, for example, that emrssrons from a
source Am State B caused cancer m resrdents of State C. 89
Even if the prereqmsrtes for liability are established, and mate
nal damage Is proven, full relief may not be readily available.
One suggestion IS that damages for transboundary pollution
under mtematronallaw mclude compensation for loss or damage
to an mdivrdual's property mcluding loss of an exrstmg tangible
asset and temporary or permanent loss of Its use, personal InJUry
and damage consequent upon death. Survivors are thus enabled
"to obtam compensation for financral loss they may suffer when
the vrctim provided for their support."90 On the other hand, economrc loss rs ordinarily not recoverable, although vanous declarations, resolutions and conventrons on pollutron mclude recovery
for such loss. 91 Psychologrcal damage or emotional distress must
also be consrdered as a form of damages which may or may not be
recoverable. 92 With regard to transboundary pollutron there rs a
trend toward wrdenmg the range of compensable damage while
limitmg the amount of liability 9 3
An entrrely separate remedial Issue IS whether a state may contmue to permit conduct for whrch It rs liable m damages, or
whether prospective InJunctive relief would be appropnate whiCh
hard to establish that [such an obligation] already exists as part of customary mternauonal
law. !d. at 542.
88. See Hand), supra note 72, at 75, n.I57
89. See, e.g., Kelson, supra note 81, at 238-242.
90. Pontavice, Compmsatwnfor Transjront1er PollutiOn Damage, m LEGAL AsPECT OF TRANS·
FRONTIER PoLLUTION 409 (Orgamzauon of Economic Cooperation and Development
1977). See also RESTATEMENT OF fOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 602 (1983).
91. /d.
92. /d.
93. !d. at 485.
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reqmres the state to discontmue the harmful conduct. In a seminal article on the Umted States atomte weapon tests m 1954 m
the Pacific Provmg Grounds, McDougal and Schlet, wntmg m
1960, noted:
No mternational tribunal has yet uneqmvocally faced the ISsue
whether a state may contmue to carry on conduct for which It Is
liable m damages, but sound policy decrees that mternational
law should parallel mumcipal law m this respect. Although no
legal Issues were formally resolved between Japan and the
Umted States, the settlement m fact reached a desirable legal
result. Japan explicitly refused to demand that the Umted
States discontmue Its tests, and the Umted States paid two million dollars m damages Without reference to questions of legal
liability Only third parties, unembarrassed by responsibilities
for the defense and secunty of the free world, seem unable to
precelVe the need for an appropnate discnmmat10n between
remedy for damage and mutual tolerance for VItal mterests. 94

McDougal and Schlei's analysts, however ts troubling m several
respects. The traditiOnal "balancmg of the eqmttes" for InJUnc
ttve relief under mumctpal law has been demonstrated to under
value environmental concerns. In the gmse of protectmg the
"public's mterest" Umted States courts, for example, have often
shown an unwillingness to order cessat10n of mcome producmg,
yet pollutmg facilities.9 5 When faced with unemployment and
loss of mcome that Is easily measured, balancmg the equities
tends to Ignore the Importance of clean air and water good
health, and aesthetiC values which are not readily reduced to
monetary value. In the gmse of "the defense and secunty of the
free world," McDougal and Schlei would similarly strike the balance m favor of military and strategtc supenonty at the expense
of the global environment. Their approach also runs counter to a
growmg awareness that war IS the greatest threat to the environment and that national secunty encompasses environmental
secunty 96
94. McDougal and Schle1, The Hydrogtm Bomb Tests m PerspectiVe: Lawful Measures for Securtty, 64 YALE L.J. 648, 694-95, (1955).
95. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlanuc Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 257
N.E.2d 870 (1970).
96. Treaues restnctmg nuclear weapons and other weapons threatenmg environmental
destrucuon mclude: Treaty Banmng Nuclear Weapons Tests m the Atmosphere, m Outer
Space and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T 1313, T.l.A.S. No. 5433; Treaty on
PrmCiples Govemmg the AcuviUes of States m the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, supra note 86; Treaty for the Prohibition
of Nuclear Weapons m Latin Amenca (Treaty ofTiatelolco), Feb. 14, 1967 634 U.N.T.S.
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TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION OF THE GLOBAL COMMONS

Transboundary pollutiOn which contammates the ocean
presents Its own umque Issues of environmental protectiOn under
mternatiOnal law 97 The four Geneva Conventions of 1958 took
only a prelimmary step toward environmental protectiOn of the
oceans. 98 Part VII of the Law of the Sea ConventiOn more specifically governs protection and preservation of the marme environment, mcluding enforcement of the ConventiOns reqmrement. 99
281, repnnted m, 61.L.M. 521 (1967); Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839; Treaty on the Prohibition of the Implacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the
Ocean Floor and m the Subsoil Thereof, Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337·
Convention on Prohibition of the Development Production, and Stockpiling of Bactenologtcal (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26
U.S.T 583, T.I.A.S. No. 8062; Conventwn on the Prohib1t1on of Military or Any Other Hostile Use
of Environmental ModificatiOn Techmques, G.A. Res. 31/72, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39) at
36, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1976); see also Weiss, supra note 87 at 556-57· Resolut1o11 Regarding
Weapons of Mass Destruction tn Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1884 (XVIII), 18 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 15) at 13, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1964), repnnted m, 2 I.L.M. 1192 (1963).
97 For analysis of state' obligation to prevent environmental damage to International watercourses, see Carvell, The North Dakota Garnson Diverswn Project and /nternatwnal
Environmental Law, 60 N.D.L. REv. 603 (1984).
98. The Convention on the Contmental Shelf, April 29, 1958, art. 5(7), 1 U.S.T 471,
T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 331, makes protection of the livmg resources of the h1gh
seas from "harmful agents mandatory for all coastal states.
The ConventiOn on the Tern tonal Sea and the Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, art. 24
(l), 2 U.S.T 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, provides:
ln zone of the h1gh seas contlguous to 1ts terntonal sea, the coastal State may exerCise the control necessary to:
(a) prevent the mfnngement of Its
samtary regulations wllhm Its tern tory or
temtonal sea;
(b) pumsh mfrmgement of the above regulations commllted w1thm Its terntory or
temtonal sea.
The Convention on Fishmg and Conservation of the L1vmg Resources of the High Seas,
April 29, 1958, art. 7 I U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 599 U.N.T.S. 285, allows any
coastal state to adopt unilateral measures of conservation appropnate to any stock of fish
or other manne resources m an area of the h1gh seas adjacent to Its temtonal sea, if such
measures are not arnved at through negotiations with other mterested states w1thm six
months.
The Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, art. 24, 13 U.S.T 2312, T.I.A.S. No.
5200,450 U.N.T.S. 82, reqmres States to draw up regulations to prevent pollution of the
seas by the discharge of oil from sh1ps or p1pe\ines or resu\tmg from the exp\mtallon or
exploration of the seabed and Its subsoil, takmg account of ex1stmg prov1s1ons on the
subJect, and similarly art. 25 reqmres the takmg of measures to prevent pollution of the
seas from the dumpmg of radioactive wastes, "takmg mto account any standards and regulauons wh1ch may be formulated by the competent mtemational orgamzations
of the
seas or a1r space above, resultmg from any radioactive matenals or other harmful agents.
99. Umted Natwns Conventwn on the Law of the Sea, supra note 86. Art. 194 requires states
to take all necessary measures to prevent pollution of the manne environment, mcluding
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In recent years there have been numerous multilateral conventions restnctmg pollutiOn of the seas, 100 such as those m Pnnciples 6, 7 and 26 of the Stockholm Declarat10n. 10 1 It has been
postted by more than one commentator that "what was once an
the prevention of releases of toXIC, hannful and nox1ous substances from land-based
sources, from or through the atmosphere, and by dumpmg. Under art. 198, state whiCh
becomes aware of cases m wh1ch the manne environment 1s m 1mmment danger of bemg
damaged or has been damaged by polluuon shall Immediately notify other States It deems
likely to be affected by such damage, as well as the competent mtemauonal orgamzauons,
global or regwnal. Arts. 207 to 211 reqmre states to establish laws to control pollution
from land-based sources, seabed actlvltles, dumpmg, and from vessels. Art. 212 prov1des:
l. States shall, w1thm a1r space under the1r sovere1gn1ty or with regard to vessels or
a1r craft ftymg the1r flag or of the1r reg1stry, establish national laws and regulations to
prevent, reduce and control pollution of the manne environment from or through the
atmosphere, takmg mto account mtematlonally agreed rules, standards and recommended pract\Ces and procedures, and the safety of atr navtgatton.
2. States shall also take other measures as may be necessary to prevent, reduce and
control such pollution.
3. States, actmg m particular through competent mtematlonal orgamzatlons or diplomatic conference shall endeavor to establish global and reg1onal rules, standards
and recommended practices and procedures to prevent, reduce and control pollution
of the manne environment from or through the atmosphere.
100. 1954 International Convention for the Prevention of the Pollution of the Sea by
Oil, July, 1958, 3 U.S.T 2989, T.l.A.S. No. 4900, 327 U.N.T.S. 3; 1962 Amendments to
the 1954 Convention for the Prevention of Pollution by the Sea by Oil, May 18, 1967 2
U.S.T 1523, T.l.A.S. No. 6109, 600 U.N.T.S. 332; 1969 Amendments to the 1954 Convention for the Prevention of the Pollution of the Sea by Oil, annexed to IMCO Assembly
Res. A. 175(vi), Oct. 21, 1969; lntemauonal Convent1on Relatmg to Intervention on the
High Seas m Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, Nov. 29, 1969, Brussels, repnnted m, 9
l.L.M. 25 (1970); lntemauonal Convenuon on Civil Ltability for Oil PoUuuon Damage,
Nov. 29, 1969, Brussels, repnnted m, 9 l.L.M. 45 (1970); Agreement Concemmg Pollution
of the North Sea Oil, June 9, 1969, 704 U.N.T.S. 3, repnnted m, 9 I.L.M. 359 (1970); Convention Relatmg to Civil L1ability m the Field of Mantlme Carnage of Nuclear Matenal,
Dec. 17 1971, repnntedm, 11 I.L.M. 277 (1972); Convention on the Establishment ofan
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Dec. 18, 1971, repnnted m,
II l.L.M. 284 (1972); Convenuon for the Prevention of Manne Pollution by Dumpmg
from Sh1ps and A1rcraft, Feb. 15, 1972, repnnted m, II I.L.M. 262 (1972); ConventiOn on
the PreventiOn of Manne Pollution by Dumpmg of Wastes and Other Matter, Nov. 13,
1972, 26 U.S.T 2403, T.l.A.S. No. 8165, repnnted m, 11 l.L.M. 1294 (1972); International
Convention for the Preventwn ofPolluuon from Sh1ps, Nov. 2, 1972, repnnted m, 12I.L.M.
1319 (1973), (Nordic) Convention on Environmental Protection, Feb. 19, 1974, repnnted
m, 13 I.L.M. 591 (1974); Convention for the Prevention of Manne Pollution from Land
Based Sources, Feb. 16, 1976, repnnted m, 15 l.L.M. 290 (1976).
101. Stockholm DeclaratiOn of the Umted Natzons Conference on the Human Environment, supra
note 66. Pnnople 6 states:
The discharge of tox1c substances or of other substances and the release of heat, m
such quantities or concentrations as to exceed the capacity of the env1ronment to
render them harmless, must be halted m order to ensure that senous or Irreversible
damage IS not mfticted upon ecosystems. The JUSt struggle of the peoples of all countnes agamst polluuon should be supported.
Pnnople 7 prov1des:
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mchoate doctrme of "pollutiOn" m mternatiOnal law has smce
evolved mto a coherent and bmding prmciple of customary mter
nauonal law or at the very least, mto a general pnnCiple of law
recogmzed by cwilized natlons." 102 Histoncally however waters
wtthm the temtonal JUnsdiction of a natiOn, state or states were
presumed to be solely withm their control, and mternat10nal waters were presumed to be outside the control of any natiOn
state. 103 The 1982 ConventiOn of the Law of the Sea has been
heralded as possibly enunCiatmg a general prmciple of state responsibility and liability for InJUry to the manne environment. 104
Most mternatiOnal law scholars now take the positiOn that customary mternatwnallaw provides that all natiOns share responsibility to protect the ocean areas beyond their temtones, which
mcludes an obligatiOn to control their Citizens to assure such
protectwn. 105
The Trail Smelter case s emphasis on matenal damage to the ter
ntory of another state may be seen as a limitatiOn on recovery for
damage to shared global resources, but IS perhaps more appropnately seen as a decision simply limited to the Issue ·of damage
presented m the arbitratiOn as no Issue of InJury to the global
common resources was alleged. 106 In the Nuclear Test Cases, 107
States shall take all possible steps to prevent pollution of the seas by substances that
are liable to create hazards to human health, to harm livmg resources and marme life,
to damage amemtles or to mterfere with other legitimate uses of the sea.
PnnCiple 26 focuses on the harmful effects of nuclear weapons:
Man and h1s environment must be spared the effects of nuclear weapons and all other
means of mass destruction. States must stnve to reach prompt agreement, m the relevant mternauonal organs, on the elimmauon and complete destruction of such
weapons.
See a/so RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw§§ 611-612 (1983).
102. Tiewul, supra note 84, at 55; compare McDougal & Schle1, supra note 94 (argumg
that freedom of the h1gh seas mcludes the freedom to conduct nuclear weapons tests); and
Margolis, The Hydrogen Bomb Expmments and lnternatwnal Law, 64 YALE LJ. 629 ( 1955). Re
cently, many nations have JOmed together to develop standards to control pollutiOn m
mutually shared seas, such as the Baltic, the Meditteranean, and the North Seas. See
Keches, Regwnal Seas: An Emerg~ng Manne Policy Approach, m CENTER FOR OcEAN MANAGEMENT STUDIES, CoMPARATIVE MARINE Poucv at 17-20 (1981).
103. Belsky, Management of Large Manne Ecosystems: Dcvelopmg New Rule of Customary
/nternatwna/ Law, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 733, 734-742 (1985).
!04. Hargrove, Environment and the Th1rd Conference of Law of the Sea, m WHo PROTECTS
THE OcEAN? 191, 208 (J. Hargrove ed. 1975). There has been considerable debate over
whether the rules m the 1982 Convention are customary law. Belsky, supra note 103, at
753, n.96.
!05. /d. at 751-53.
!06. Rubm, supra note 61, at 279-81.
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the InternatiOnal Court of Justice was directly presented wtth the
tssue of recovery for environmental damage to the htgh seas, but,
unfortunately dismissed the case as moot. When the French
Government mdicated 1t would conduct no further atmosphenc
tests of nuclear weapons m the Pacific Ocean, the Court held the
cases to be moot and demed the request for a declaratory judgment.108 Yet pnor to dismtssal, the Court had tssued an Intenm
Order of Protection under Arttcle 41 of the Statute of the InternatiOnal Court ofJustiCe upon a finding of pnma Jane JUnsdictton. 109
In a stmilar controversy the Umted States settled ex gratza
(wtthout reference to liability) a clatm from Japan for lllJUry to a
Japanese fishmg vessel and fishermen caught m the radioactive
fallout from an Amencan nuclear test m the Pacific Ocean. 110 In
the Fukuryu Maru affair the Umted States patd Japan two million
dollars m compensatiOn for the damages sustamed, mcluding mJUnes to the tuna fish mdustry m Japan. 111 It may certamly be
concluded that the settlement reflected opmw JUrtS that the settlement was legally compelled. 112 The Items of damage, however
did not mclude fish rendered radioactive m the ocean except to
the extent they were later caught by Japanese fishermen and,
thus, constituted economic mJury to Japanese mterests. 113
The speCial and potentially catastrophiC problem of radioactive
fallout ments separate analysts, m that radioacttve fallout from
weapons tests may also vtolate the Partial Test Ban Treaty 114
107 Nuclear Test Cases (Australia v. France) 1973 I.CJ. 99 and (New Zealand v.
France) 1973 I.C.J. 135.
108. Nuclear Test Cases (Australia v. France) 1974 I.CJ. 253 and (New Zealand v.
France) 1974 I.CJ. 457
109. 1973 I.CJ. 99, 102; and 1973 I.CJ. 135, 138. See also Elkmd, French Nuclear Testmg
and Artzcle 41 -Another Blow to the Authonty of the Court?, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 39
(1974).
110. Rubm, supra note 61, at 279.
Ill. /d.
112. /d. In the Umted States, the authonty under whiCh ex grat1a settlements were made
to forergn clarmants by the Executive was generally limited to mentonous" clarms. 10
U.S.C. § 2734 (1964); 22 U.S.C. § 2669(b) (Supp. I, 1965-66); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2672, 2674
(1964); but see McDougal & Schier, supra note 94.
l\3. Rubm, supra note 6\, at 280.
114. Treaty Banmng Nuclear Weapon Tests m the Atmosphere, m Outer Space and
Under Water, supra note 96. A full analysrs of whether nuclear weapons tests, parucrpauon
m the nuclear arms race, or use of nuclear weapons vwlated mternatronal law 1s beyond
the scope of th1s arucle. Bnefly, however, rt should be mentroned that the Statute of the
InternatiOnal Atomrc Energy Agency, Oct. 26, 1956, art. 2 and 3, 8 U.S.T 1093, T.I.A.S.
No. 3873, 276 U.N.T.S. 3, prohibrts the use of any specral fissronable and other matenals,
servrces, eqmpment, facilities or mformauon made available by the Agency or at rts re-
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The Partial Test Ban Treaty prohibits states from nuclear explosions m the atmosphere; beyond their terntones, mcluding outer
space; underwater mcluding terntonal waters on high seas, or m
any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debns
to be present outside the terntonal limits of the State under
whose JUnsdiction or control such explosiOn IS conducted.l 15 If
the Partial Test Ban Treaty IS evidence of customary mtemat10nal
law then any nuclear actiVIty resultmg m radioactive fallout
outside the State s terntory may violate customary mternat10nal
law Without further reference to any other rules of mtemat10nal
law governmg pollutiOn generally 116
quest or under 1ts supervlSlon or control m such way as to further any military purpose.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T 483,
T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161, forb1ds "non-nuclear states" (states other than the
People' Republic of Chma, France, the Umted States, the Sov1et Unwn, and the Umted
Kingdom) from manufactunng or otherwise acqumng nuclear weapons or nuclear exploSive devJCes. It may be argued that the Partial Test Ban Treaty and the Non-Proliferation
Treaty have now become customary mtematlonallaw, and that they together w1th numerous U.N. resolutions mdicate customary mternatlonal law opposed to the acqmslllon,
development, detonation and/or deployment of nuclear weapons and other nuclear exploSive dev1ces. See, e.g., Agamst Sov1et Plan to Explode 50 Megaton Bomb, G.A. Res. 1632 (XVI),
16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961); On an Undertakmg by Countnes Possessmg No Nuclear Weapons Not to Have Such Weapons zn their Temtory, G.A. Res. 1664
(XVI), 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 5, U.N. Doc. N5100 (1961); On Preventwn of the
Wider Dissemznatwn of Nuclear Weapons, G.A. Res. 1665 (XVI), 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17)
at 5, U.N. Doc. N5100 (1961); On the Urgent Need for Suspenswn of Nuclear Tests, G.A. Res.
1762 A & B (XVIII), 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 3, U.N. Doc. N5127 (1962); Regardtng Weapons of Mass Destruction m Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1884 (XVIU). 18 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 15) at 13, U.N. Doc. N5515 (1964); On the Urgent Need for Suspension of Nuclear and
Thermo-Nuclear, G.A. Res. 1910 (XVIII), 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 15) at 14, U.N. Doc.
N5515 (1963); see also Falk, The Sh1moda Case: A Legal Apprmsal of the Atom1c Attacks Upon
Hirosh1ma and Nagasaki, 59 AM.J. INT'L L. 759 (1965); U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4), 11(1) and
26(1). However, It may be argued with equal force that the treaties have not been w1dely
enough accepted to become customary mtematwnallaw and that U.N. resolutions by their
very nature are not bmding m any legal sense. On the legal effect of General Assembly
resolutions, seeR. FALK, THE STATUS OF THE LAw IN INT'L SociETY 176 (l970);Johnson, The
Effect of Resolutions of the General Assembly of the Umted Natwns, 32 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 97
( 1956); and Sloan, The Binding Force of Recommendatwn of the General Assembly of the Umted
Natwns, 25 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1-33 (1948).
115. Treaty Banmng Nuclear Weapons Tests m the Atmosphere, m Outer Space and
Under Water, supra note 96.
ll6. It has even been argued by one commentator that location of nuclear power
plant near national boundanes vwlates mtematwnallaw. The author comes to the concluSion that:
Assummg that no speCial authonzmg Circumstances prevail, conduct of an activity m
frontier areas IS mcompatible With mtematlonal law if: (a) the activity concerned mvolves maJor nsk of transnational harm; (b) this nsk 1s function, at least to Significant degree, of the location m wh1ch the activity takes place; and (c) the activity m that
frontier location amounts to an meffiCient use between the nsk creatmg and nsk ex-
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LAw

GovERNING

TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION

As Is so often the case, JUdicial enforceability IS an obstacle to
enforcement of mternatiOnal responsibility for extraterntonal
pollution. The mdiv1dual pnvate plamtiff will be essentially restncted to recovery m the domestic courts of state, wherem the
environmental InJUry occurred or the mJunes took place. 117
Whether mternat10nal rules of liability can be utilized will depend
pnmarily upon whether and the extent to whtch mternatwnallaw
IS mcorporated mto the states domestic law 118 For example, m
the Umted States courts non-resident aliens may sue under 28
U.S.C. § 1350 m the federal courts for extraterntonally effective
torts committed wtthm the Umted States. 11 9 Foretgn natiOnals
may bnng smt m federal court based on state tort law under diversity JUnsdictton. 12o In the Paquette Habana case, the Umted
States Supreme Court has stated that "
where there Is no
treaty and no controlling executive or legtslative act or JUdioal
decision, resort must be had to customs and usages of ctvilized
natiOns.
" 121 Thus, to a limited extent, mternat10nallaw may
be utilized by the Umted States courts. 1 22 Other procedural hur
dles, such as soveretgn tmmumty and standing, must, however be
overcome. Under the Umted States Foretgn Sovereign Immumttes Act of 1976, for example, there IS JUnsdictton m the Umted
States federal courts over a foretgn state for among other thmgs,
direct InJury m the Umted States by a sovereign as a result of
posed states of the mtemauonally shared natural resources concerned, provided the
nsk Js not already of such an obvious nature or magmtude as to render the activity
mcompatible per se w1th fundamental pnnc1ples of the sovereign equality and mdependence of states.
Hand!, An Intematwnal Legal PerspectiVe on the Conduct of Abnormally Dangerous Act1v1t1es m Frontii!T Areas: The Case of Nuclear Power Plant Sitmg, 7 EcoLOGY L.Q I, 47 (1978).
117 Comment, Compensatmg Pnvate Parties for Transnatwnal Pollut1o11 Injury, 58 ST. JoHN's
L. REV. 528, 531 (1984).
118. For companson of domestic polluuon laws, see P DowNING AND K. HUNF, INT'L
COMPARISONS IN IMPLEMENTING POLLUTION LAws (1983).
119. Compensatmg Pnvate Parties for Transnatwnal Pollut1on, supra note 117 at 533.
120. !d.
121. The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); see alm Lillich, Domestic lnstllutwns m 4
THE FUTURE OF THE INT'L LEGAL ORDER 384, 387-392 (1972).
122. See The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); Filaruga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d
876 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Fischer, Aod Ram: Deploymg Pnvate Damage Actwns Agarnst Transboundary Polluters, 19 TRIAL 57 (1983).
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commercial activities. 123 Under the Umted States Supreme Court
deciSion m Sierra Club v. Morton, 12 4 the plamtiff will have to
demonstrate that the plamtiff uses the InJUred environment and
has suffered tnjury m that use.l 25 A promiSing approach toward
overcommg standing obstacles relevant to transboundary pollution IS reflected m the Nordic Convention on the ProtectiOn of
the Environment, grantmg citizens of the member countnes reCiprocal access to each other s courts and admmistrative agenCies
for "any person
affected by a nmsance caused by environmentally harmful activities." 126 Even if the plamtiff succeeds m a domestic court, enforcement extranat10nally IS largely dependent
upon the cooperation of the defendant state, and InJUnctive relief
Is highly unlikely 121
For state agamst state claims, the obvious forum for enforce
ment IS the Intenat10nal Court of JustiCe, yet the hurdles to enforcement are at least as 1mposmg as those whiCh may be
encountered m domestic courts.I 28 The Court's JUnsdictiOn ex
tends to "all cases which the parties refer to It and all matters
specially provided for m the Charter of the Umted Nations or m
treaties and conventions m force." 129 A smt, however may only
be brought by a state agamst a state.I 30 No state IS subJeCt to the
Court's JUnsdiction unless It has consented to be}3 1 Any state
whiCh has been sued may not only assert Its own reservatiOns to
consent to be sued (asummg It has consented m the first place),
123. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1982); see generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1391, 1441, 16021611 ( 1982). Sectwn 1605 qualifies the doctnne of absolute sovereign Immumty by allowmg federal courts to have JUnsdiction over claims agamst sovereign based on waiver
ofimmumty, commercial activity camed on Withm the Umted States, or outside the Umted
States if the activity causes direct effect withm the Umted States, expropnation, nghts m
gifts or bequests of immovable property, non-commercial torts, and certam mantime liens.
Id. § 1605.
124. 405 u.s. 727 (1972).
125. Weiss, supra note 87 at 567
126. Convention on the ProtectiOn of the Environment, Feb. 19, 1971, reprtnted m, 13
I.L.M. 591 (1974).
127 Compensatmg Pnvate Part1es for Transnational Pollut1on, supra note 117 at 531-32;
Fischer, supra note 122, at 58.
128. Of course, the state may pursue diplomatic and International channels to obtam
compensatory damages, or attempt arbitration or negotiation. Compensatmg Pnvate Parttes
for Transnational In;ury, supra note ll 7 at 531.
129. Statute of the International Court ofjustice, supra note 52, art. 36(1); see also Weiss,
supra note 87 at 570.
130. Statute of the International Court of justice, supra note 70, art. 34; see also Compensating Pnvate Part1es for TransnatiOnal Pollution, supra note 117 at 538.
131. Statute of International Court of Justice, supra note 70, art. 36(2).
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but also those of the plamtiff state. 132 Such reservations fre
quently exempt from the JUrisdictiOn of the Court Issues of "domestic" JUrisdiction of "national security " 133 Even 1f these
hurdles are surmountable, there must be complete exhaust1on of
any domestic remedies. 134 Even assummg that all these obstacles
may be overcome and the plamtiff state wms, opmwns of the
Court may only be enforced by the Umted Nations Security
Council, m wh1ch the maJOr nuclear powers have the veto
power 135
V

LIABILITY FOR TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION PURSUANT
TO TREATY

LAW

Enforcement of mternatwnal law by treaty 1s more effective
than enforcement of custom and general prmCiples of law 136 Yet
on the whole, enforcement provisions m extant treaties are too
vague to provide for meanmgful enforcement, or not enough nuclear powers are parties to the treaties to provide any meanmgful
protect1on. 137 Although a full survey of all such treaty provisions
governmg trans boundary pollution 1s beyond the scope of this ar
ticle, 138 there are only a few relevant to transboundary pollution
from nuclear acodents.
132. "The states parties to the present Statute may at any ume declare that they recogmze as compulsory 1pso facto and Without special agreement m relat1on to any other state acceptmg the same obligation, the JUrtsdictton of the Court.
ld.
133. See generally WESTON, fALK & D'AMATO, INT'L LAw AND WORLD ORDER 415-426
(1980).
134. Compensatmg Pnvate Part1es for Transnational Pollution, supra note 117 at 557
135. U.N. CHARTER art. 94.
136. See, e.g., Compensatmg Pnvate Plamtiffs for Transnational Pollut1on, supra note 117 at
557
137 !d. at 540-41.
138. The 1972 Stockholm Conference led to the creation of an msUtuuon, the Umted
Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) as catalyst and coordinator of international enVIronmental efforts, mcluding mternauonal efforts to protect the manne environment.
Belsky, supra note 103, at 741 n.33. Also followmg the conference, several national governments and mternauonal orgamzauons responded to the dictate of Pnnctple 22 of the
Stockholm Declaration calling for states to cooperate to develop utternauonal law for
transboundary environmental damage. One such response was from the Envin>nment
Committee of the Orgamzauon for Economtc Cooperation and Development (OECD).
The OECD ts regiOnal economic orgamzauon established m Europe m 1961. For v1ew
of few regiOnal environmental programs, see generally Comment, Equal Rights of Access m
Matters ofTransboundary Pollution: Its Prospects m lndustnal and Develapmg Countnes, 14 CAL. W
INT'L LJ. 192 (1984); see also Bentil,lmplementatlon of Common Market Envzronment Protectzon
Laws, 128 Souc. J. 393 (1984); Dickstem, Nat1onal Envzronmental Hazards and lnternatzonal
Law, 23 INT'L & CoMP L.Q 426, 443-444 (1974) (describmg Euratom control over radia-
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The Vienna ConventiOn on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage
grants JUrisdictiOn over cases for nuclear damage to the courts of
the state m whose terntory the damage occurred.I 39 Article II of
the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage I40
makes the "operator" (the person so designated or recogmzed by
the Installation State) of a nuclear mstallation liable for any "nuclear damge" "Nuclear damage" IS defined m Article I(l)(k) to
mclude:
(i) loss oflife, any personal InJUry or any loss of, or damage to,
property which anses out of or results from the radioactive
properties or a combmatwns of radioactive properties With
toxic, explosive or other hazardous properties of nuclear fuel
or radioactive products or wastes m, or of nuclear matenal
commg from, ongmatmg m, or sent to, a nuclear mstallauon;
(ii) any other loss or damage so ansmg or resultmg if and to
the extent that the law of the competent court so provides; and
(iii) if the law of the InstallatiOn State so provides, loss of life,
any personal InJUry or any loss of, or damage to, property
which anses out of or results from other Iomzmg radiation
emitted by any other source of radiation mside a nuclear
mstallatiOn." I 4 I

A responsible operator may be an mdividual, a partnership, any
pnvate or public body any mternat10nal orgamzation havmg a
legal personality under the law of the InstallatiOn State.I 42 LiabilIty for nuclear damage IS absolute except that: the operator may
be exempt from liability for damage directly due to an act of
tlon hazards); and the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary A1r Pollution, Nov. 13,
1979, E/ECE/1010, T.I.A.S. No. 10541. For further elaboration on Umted Nauons efforts
to protect the environment and those of other mtematlonal orgamzatlons, see Sm1th, The
Umted Nat1ons and the Environment: Somet1111es Great Not1on~, 19 TEXAS INT'L LJ. 335 (1984);
DeveWpments, The Umted Nat1ons EnVIronment Programme After Decade: The Nazrob1 Sess1on of
Spmal Character May 1981, 12 DENVERJ. INT'L L. & PoLICY 269 (1982-83); OFfiCE OF RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT, EPA, A SURVEY OF INT'L INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS:
THE STRATEGIES THEY USE TO ABATE POLLUTION, (1978); STANLEY, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT BY THE UNITED NATIONS 1972).
139. Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963, repnnted
m, International Atomic Energy Agency, International Convention on Civil Liability for
Nuclear Damage (1974) (Legal Senes No.4). See also Te1wul, supra note 84, at 61, n.57
The Vienna Conventton was unammously adopted by the IAEA m 1963. The Sovtet
Umon Js member of the IAEA but JS not party to the Convention. The analysis of
Soviet responsibility herem, therefore, IS apart from whatever responsibility It may be held
to pursuant to this treaty obligation. Despite Tiewul' assertion, art. XI (I) giVes JUnsdic
tiOn only to where the "incident" occurred.
140. Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, supra note 139, art. II.
141. /d. art. 1(1)(K).
142. ld. art. l(l)(a), (c).
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armed conflict, hostiliues, civil war or msurrectiOn; 143 that the
damage resulted wholly or partially from the gross negligence or
mtent10nal wrong of the victim himself, or that, unless the state
otherwise provides, the damage resulted from grave natural disaster of an exceptiOnal character 144 Where the nuclear accident oc
curred outside the terntory of any state, or where Its location
cannot accurately be determmed, the courts of the mstallat10n
state have JUnsdictiOn. 145 The Vienna ConventiOn excludes any
JUrisdictional Immumties ansmg under national or mternat10nal
law once a court has obtamed JUnsdictiOn under the Convention.146 The extent of recoverable damage may not be limited to
less than five million Umted States dollars. 14 7
Under Article VI(l) of the Vienna Convention, claims for compensation With respect to nuclear damage are barred, unless
presented w1thm ten years from the date of the nuclear acodent.148 This limitation does not apply If under the law of the
InstallatiOn State, the liability of the operator IS covered by msur
ance or other financial secunty or by state funds, for a penod
longer than ten years. 149 Notwithstanding these provisions, the
forum state may erect a limitation penod of between three and
ten years from the date on which the InJured party had or should
have had knowledge both of the damage, and of the Identity of
the operator liable therefor 150 Unless the law of the competent
state otherwise provides, a person who has brought a timely ac
t10n for compensation may at any time before final Judgment
amend h1s claim to take mto account any aggravatiOn of the InJUnes.151 The InstallatiOn State shall msure the payment of claims
agamst the operator providing the necessary funds to the extent
that the y1eld of msurance or other financial secunty IS madequate
to satisfy such cla1ms. 152 An optiOnal protocol to the Convention
143. /d. art. IV(3)(a).
144. /d. art. IV
145. !d. art. XI(2).
146. /d. art. XIV
147 !d. art. V
148. ld. art. VI(l).
149. !d.
150. /d. art. VI{3).
151. /d. art. VI(4). In addiuon to the Vienna convention, there are also several bilateral
and reg10nal arrangements for the payment of compensation to vrctuns of nuclear actrvrty
or polluuon resultmg therefrom on the hrgh seas, the scope of liability rangmg from partial to absolute. See Tiewul, supra note 84, at 61 n. 59.
152. Vienna Convention, supra note 139, art. VII(l).
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provides that disputes concermng the mterpretation or application of the Convention are to be decided by the InternatiOnal
Court of Justice.I 53 Similar provlSlons for civil damages are contamed m the Pans Convention ofThird Party Liability m the Field
of Nuclear Energy 154 and the Brussels Convention Supplementary to the Pans ConventiOn, 155 which were sponsored by the Or
gamzatwn for Economic CooperatiOn and Development and on
which the Vienna Convention was modeled.
The Vienna Convention entered mto force m 1977 but there
are only approx1mately ten states that are parties to the Convention, and none of these states IS a maJor nuclear power 156 The
Pans ConventiOn entered mto force m 1968 and the Brussels
Supplementary ConventiOn went mto force m 1974. 157 The par
ties to these treaties do mclude most of Europe, but neither the
Soviet Umon nor the Umted States 1s a party 158
Pursuant to the Statute of the InternatiOnal AtomiC Energy
Agency "[a]ny question or dispute concernmg the mterpretation
or application [of the Statute] which IS not settled by negotiation
shall be referred to the InternatiOnal Court ofjustiCe m conformIty with the Statute of the Court, unless the parties concerned
agree on another mode of settlement." 159 The General Confer
ence and the Board of Governors of IAEA, with authonzation
from the General Assembly of the Umted Nations, may request an
advisory opmwn on any legal questiOn ansmg withm the scope of
the IAEA s actiVIties. 160 However the Agency has no authonty to
Issue mandatory safety standards and, therefore, this provision
153. Vienna ConventiOn, supra note 139, art. I.
154. Pans Convention on Third Party Liability m the Field of Nuclear Energy, july 29,
1960, repnnted m, 55 AM.]. INT'L L. 1082 (1961).
155. Convention Supplementary to the Pans Convention of July 29, 1960 on Th1rd
Party Liability m the Field of Nuclear Energy, supra note 154. See also The Convention on
the Liability of Operations of Nuclear Sh•ps,Jan. 31, 1963, repnnted m, 2 I.L.M. 685 (1963);
see also Convention on Civil Liability m the Field of Mantime Camage of Nuclear Matenal,
Dec. 17 1971, repnnted m, ll I.L.M. 277 (1972) (adds to the Pans and Vienna
Conventions).
156. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT NUCLEAR ENERGY
AGENCY

&

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, NUCLEAR THIRD PARTY LIABILITY AND

47 (1985).
157 !d.
158. /d.
159. Statute of International Atomic Energy Agency, supra note ll4, art. XVIIA.
160. !d. art. XVIIB. Although the IAEA IS authonzed to adopt safety standards, the
standards are techmcally without bmding effect. See generally, Dickstem, supra note 138, at
426, 436-38.
INSURANCE STATUS AND PROSPECTS
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would do little or nothmg to Impose state liability for transboundary damage from unsafe operatiOn of a nuclear reactor
IAEA s safety standards are meant to apply only to the agency s
own operatiOns and operatiOns earned out at Its request or under
Its control or superv1Slon. 161 Safety standards are merely recommended by the IAEA and are not, therefore, bmding on nuclear
activities not provided through the NRC. The IAEA, however
has negotiated bilateral agreements for safety standards with
twenty-one countnes. 162
For pollutiOn of the sea, the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention
Imposes on the mdividual state the responsibility to enforce their
own laws and to adopt the necessary legislative, admmistrative,
and other measures to Implement mternatwnal rules and standards established through competent mternat10nal orgamzat10ns
or diplomatlC conferences.l 6~ The prov1Slons of the 1982 ConventiOn, unlike the provlSlons of the four 1958 ConventiOns discussed above, m all likelihood establish new pnnCiples of
mternat10nallaw not codification of pre-existmg custom. There
fore, they would be bmding only on the parties to the ConventiOn. Perhaps the most forceful enforcement provlSlon m the
1982 ConventiOn IS the remedy drawn from customary mternatwnal law of mtervent10n for mantime casualties to avmd pollutiOn under Article 221 That Article preserves "
the nght of
States, pursuant to mternatwnallaw both customary and conventiOnal, to take and enforce measures beyond the terntonal sea
proportiOnate to the actual or threatened damage to protect their
coastline or related mterests, mcluding fishmg, from pollution or
threat of pollutiOn followmg upon a man time casualty or acts relatmg to such a casualty which may reasonably be expected to
result m maJOr harmful consequences." 164

161. Statute oflnternauona1 Atom1c Energy Agency, supra note 114, art. IIA.6. Compare
Treaty Establishmg the European Atom1c Energy Commumty (Euratom) art. 30-39, 77-85,
Mar. 25, 1957 298 U.N.T.S. 167 (mandatory safety standards for all members).
162. International Nuclear Safety Concerns: Heanngs Before the Subcomm. on Energy, Nuclear
Proliferatwn, and Governmental Processes of the Senate Comm. on Governmental AffairS, 99th Cong.,
2d. Sess., 5 (1986) (statement of Allan I. Mende1owltz, Assoc. Dir., National Secunty and
lnt'l AffairS Div., GAO)
163. See generally Umted Natwns Conventwn on the Law of the Sea, supra note 86, art. 213222.
164. /d., art. 221(1).
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NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS AND PREVENTION OF DAMAGE UNDER
INTERNATIONAL

LAw

It would be remiss to evaluate the Chernobyl acctdent Without
recogmtion of the human anxiety suffenng, and loss of life m the
Soviet Umon, and what may be the loss to the Soviet people of an
area of nch, much needed agncultural land. RIChard Falk has
suggested that human nghts must mclude "the nghts of mdividuals and groups (including those of unborn generations) to be reasonably secure about their prospects of mimmal physical wellbemg and survival (and) the duty of governments and peoples to
uphold this nght by workmg to achieve sustamable forms of natiOnal and ecological secunty " 165 Many of the mternattonal dec
laratwns that aspire to the most stnngent protection of the
environment portray the nght to a safe and clean environment as
a fundamental human nght. 166 In the context of the Chernobyl
tragedy environmental destructiOn may be seen as a depnvation
of nghts tantamount to a depnvatwn of Civil, economic and social
human nghts.
Though difficult to make an accurate assessment of the damage
to Soviet agnculturalland around Chernobyl without accurate radiatiOn measurements, some general conclusiOns can be made.
SCientists have testified that radioactiVIty was likely to have damaged soil, water livestock and crops withm a 2000-square-mile
regwn of the Ukrame that surrounds the cnppled plant. 16 ' The
Ukrame produces 20% of the Soviet gram crop, and IS the Soviet
165. R. FALK, HuMAN RIGHTS AND STATE SovEREIGNTY 146-47 (1981); see also W GoRMLEY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENT: THE NEED FORINT' CoOPERATION (1976); Cassm, Les Dr01ts de l'homme, 140 RECUEIL DES CouRS 321, 327 (1974 IV); Falk, Toward World
Order Respectful of the Global Ecosystem, ENv AFFAIRS 251 (1971); Gofman, The EXIStence of
Nuclear Weapons: Pnme Envzronmental Threat, l ENv. AFFAIRS 782 (1972); cJ. Stockholm Conventwn supra note 66, PnnCiples l, 2, & 4.
166. See The Pervers1on of SCience and Technology: An Indictment (Poona Indictment), adopted by the partiCipants m the fourteenth meetmg of the World Order Models
PrOJeCt held m Poona, India, july 2-10, 1978, repnnted m, 4 ALTERNATIVES- A jOURNAL OF
WORLD PoLicY 413 (1978-1979); Independent Declaration on the Environment (Dai Dong
Dedarauon}, adopted by the partiCipants m the Da1 Dong Independent Conference on the
Environment, Gramage Stiftsgard, Sweden, June l-6, 1972, repnnted m, l ALTERNATIVESA jouRNAL OF WoRLD PoLICY 406 (1975); Declaration on the Th1rd World and the Human
Env1ronment (01 Committee Declaration) adopted by the participants m the Conference
on Problems of the Third World and the Human Environment, Stockholm, June, 1972,
repnnted zn, B. WESTON, R. FALK & A. D'AMATO, BASIC DocUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw
AND WORLD ORDER 427 (1980).
167 N.Y. Times, May 6, 1986, at A7 col. l.
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Umon s second largest livestock production area. 168 The
Chernobyl plant ts on the northern edge of the Ukrame farm belt,
the location of the country s best soil, and a maJOr source for
wheat, sugar beets and forage for livestock. 169 North of the
Chernobyl plant ts another nch farm belt, and the Chernobyl area
Itself Is an area of datry farms and cultivation of rye, potatoes, and
fiber flax. 170 The acctdent occurred wtthm months of the harvestmg season. 171 Never before has a natiOn been faced wtth the possibility of extenstve radiatiOn damage to large tracts of
farmland. 172 Some have suggested that wtthm stx miles of the reactor land must be extremely contammated and will probably be
unmhabttable for generattons. 173
The heavtest radioactive particles produced by the accident
could be expected to fall wtthm a fifty mile radius of the plant. 174
Opttons for detoxifymg any radioactive soil are limtted. 175 For
relatively small areas, surface soil can be stnpped and buned elsewhere.176 The Umted States has used thts techmque twice-once
when a Umted States military plane carrymg nuclear weapons
crashed m Spam m the 1950's, and once as a result of contammatiOn of the Marshall Islands dunng nuclear weapons tests m the
PaCific. 177 With extensive contammatwn, the only remedy may be
to watt several hundred years. 1' 8
On May 15th Mikhail Gorbachev m a natiOnally televtsed address, clatmed "the worst has passed" and proposed a global
warmng system to handle future acCldents." 9 Ukratman Pnme
Mimster Aleksandr Lyashko told reporters m Kiev that Moscow
offiCials did not learn the full gravtty of the accident until April 28
when It was reported by the Soviet government (although one
can questiOn how long It takes to understand the gravtty of an
explosiOn m a nuclear reactor that blows Its roof off) 180 On May
168.
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1st the InternatiOnal Atomic Energy Agency sent a telex to the
Soviet authonties, urgently requestmg further details of the accident.181 The twelve member countnes of the Common Market
protested the lack of notice and mformat10n. 182 The West Ger
man Foreign Mimster Hans~Dietnch Genscher said the Soviet
Umon should authonze experts from the IAEA to VISit the Site
(they subsequently did so).I 83 Although agency mspectors had
vtstted Soviet nuclear power states m the past, the agency did not
have the authonty to order the Soviet government to supply mformatiOn.184 One newspaper reported that the Umted States
Secretary of State George Schultz was attemptmg to persuade the
Soviet Umon to agree to safety mspect10ns of Its plant by the
IAEA. 185
By May 4th, Secretary of State Schultz was argumg that there
was "an mherent obligation that states have to provide mformatiOn" about such events as nuclear acodents which have an effect
on people beyond their borders. 186 Also m May m addition to
denouncmg the Soviet Umon, the seven mdustnal nations at the
Tokyo EconomiC Summit meetmg called for a new treaty to establish rules for mternat10nal behavior m case of nuclear acodents.187 In 1981, the Umted States had floated a proposal
similar to that of the Economic Summit at the Umted Nations but
the proposal received little attention. On June 3rd, Gorbachev
himself called on other nations to JOin the Soviet Umon m
strengthemng safeguards agamst nuclear disaster such as
Chernobyl m a message to Secretary General of the Umted NatiOns calling for an mternatiOnal conventiOn on the subject. 188
The Soviet leader also called for stronger measures to prevent
acts of nuclear terronsm. 189 Most Important, he said, was "a system of prompt notification m the event of accidents and malfunc
tions at atomic power plants when such occurences are
accompamed by the release ofradiatiOn."I90 Mr Gorbachev sugI8l.
I82.
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gested that a nuclear safeguard system be codified m one or more
mtemat10nal conventions and that existmg agenCies like the InternatiOnal Atomic Energy Agency the World Health Orgamzatlon, the Umted NatiOns Envuonmental Program and the World
Meteorolog~cal Orgamzation be used to strengthen safety measures for nuclear reactors. 191 On june 10, Gorbachev went even
further In Budapest he said that the leading nuclear powers
should work JOmtly to design a new generation of more reliable
nuclear reactors and agree to provide free medical care, housmg,
and other finanCial assistance to acetdent vicUms. 192 Soviet offiCials, however reiterated Moscow s positiOn that It owed no compensation to other European countnes because of damage to
agnculture followmg the nuclear accident at Chernobyl. 193 Soviet officials have argued that damage to agnculture m Europe
had been caused by media, consumer and government reactiOn to
the accident, not a threat of radiation, and turned aside questiOns
about compensat10n. 194 Meanwhile, on june lOth m Vienna at a
meetmg of the Governmg Board of the InternatiOnal AtomiC Energy Agency countnes with nuclear weapons such as the Umted
States and the Soviet Umon seemed undecided whether to allow
military nuclear plants to be covered by a treaty requmng prompt
notificatiOn of any nuclear acetdents. 195 Two treaties were under
consideration by the IAEA. One would reqmre member countnes to mform others Immediately of any significant release of radioactive matenal. 196 The other provides for other countnes to
give prompt assistance m the event of such an acCident. 197 The
Govermng Board also came closer to agreement on a package of
safety measures mspired by Chemobyl. 198 The agency planned
to mcrease the number of mspect10ns It makes to check safety
precautions at member countnes nuclear mstallat10ns. 199
Many officials fear that any attempt to define preCisely what
kmd of accident would have to be reported would be challenged
by governments hostile to nuclear power and by any nuclear envi191.
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ronmental orgamzations. Both the Umted States and Soviet
Umon seemed unwilling to report accidents at military nuclear
plants if disclosure would oblige them to reveal military
secrets. 200 As a result, many offiCials suspect that the new treaty
will be drafted m vague terms, With the burden of deciding
whether a nuclear accident could affect other countnes restmg on
the government concerned.
On July 24th, a foreign mimstry spokesman for the Soviet
Umon said that the expenments that caused the Chernobyl nuclear accident were mtended to determme how long the plant
would contmue to produce electnCity m an unexpected reactor
shutdown. "The Important thmg IS not that the expenment was
conducted," the spokesman said, "the Important thmg IS that It
was conducted Without the necessary precautions." 201 He said
the techmcal details would be available when a report of the Soviet Umon Government Inqmry Commission was delivered to the
IAEA m Vienna m August. He also demed that eng.neers of the
Chernobyl statiOn were trymg to simulate an accident when the
real accident occurred. 202 SpeculatiOn contmued, however that
the accident may have been the result of expenments relatmg to
nuclear weapons. Among the officials dismissed after the
Chernobyl acodent was Aleksmdr G. Neshkov First Deputy MinIster of Medium Machme-Building, for the production of fissionable matenal and nuclear arms. 20 3 The connection between this
agency and the generatiOn of commercial nuclear power has not
been offioally explamed. As a result of the Chernobyl accident,
the nuclear electnoty mdustry has now been placed under a
newly formed separate Mimstry of Nuclear Power m the Soviet
Umon. 204
Everywhere, there was much talk about the Soviet Umon s InternatiOnal obligatiOn "to provide mformation." 205 Although the
mternat10nal obligatiOn of the Soviet Umon to warn other states
of the approachmg radioactivity and to exchange mformatton was
pnmarily a moral one, some mternatiOnallaw scholars argue that
200. N.Y. Times, June II, 1986, at A4, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1986, at Al5, col. 1;
Reuters, Sept. 24, 1986, AM cycle.
201. N.Y. Times, July 25, 1986, at A2, cols. 2-4.
202. /d.
203. /d.
204. /d.
205. N.Y Times, May 1, 1986, at AI, col. 3; /d. at AI, col. 5.

236

CoLUMBIA JoURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL

LAw [Vol. 12:203

there exists a present or emergmg rule of mternat10nllaw reqmr
mg states to g.ve notice of mformat10n concernmg possible environmental harm to potentially affected states. 206 Although full
analys1s of whether such a duty ex1sts 1s beyond the scope of th1s
article, an agreement mcorporatmg such an obligation and others
appears 1mmment. In fact, when a Soviet submanne carrymg nuclear weapons sank off the coast of Bermuda, the Soviet Umon
Immediately notified the Umted States, on October 4th, m ac
cordance w1th a draft accord requmng prompt notice of nuclear
accidents. 207

VII.

THE NEED FOR REFORM

If any State seeks relief under mtemat10nallaw agamst the Soviet Umon, the smt will probably not focus on the lack of notice,
but rather on the damage to health and agnculture m neighbor
mg states. For example, on May 5th, the Federal Republic of
Germany sa1d that It was settmg up a group to determme whether
It could claim compensatiOn from the Soviet Umon for eventual
damage to crops from fallout from the Chernobyl disaster 208 On
May 3, German authonties m Bonn had ordered the Impounding
of supplies of fresh milk from several da1ry regions contammated
by the fallout. 209 Although Germany never brought smt, It and
many other countnes and pnvate groups gave senous consideratiOn to the mtemat10nallaw that would govern such a smt. While
under the famous Trail Smelter case, one can conclude that a state
IS responsible for any matenal damage that occurs to another
state, even for conduct wh1ch emanates from pnvate parties
withm the offending state, if both matenal damage and causatiOn
206. For further discussiOn concemmg whether mtemauonal law reqmres notice and
exchange of mformatlon regarding
state' lawful activities wh~eh may cause transboundary environmental damage, see Carvell, The North Dakota Garnson DiversiOn Pro;ect and
International Environmental Law, 60 N.D.L. REv. 603, 637-646 (1984); Schneider, State Responsibility for Environmental Protect1on and PreservatiOn, 2 YALE STUDIES IN WoRLD PuBLIC ORDER 32, 60-65 (1975); see also Handl, supra note 116, on the legality of nuclear plant s1tmg
m border areas. Arucle 28(2) of the Atomic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany
reqmred the state to compensate VICtims of the acc1dent for property damage and agncultural damage. See also RESTATEMENT OF FoREIGN RELATIONS LAw§ 601 comment (1983).
207 N.Y. Times, Oct. 7 1986, at A30, col. I.
208. N.Y Times, May 5, 1986, at A6, col. 6. Article 38(2) of the Atomic Law of the
Federal Republic of Germany reqmred the state to compensate VICtims of the acCident for
certam property damage and agncultural losses.
209. N.Y. Times, May 3, 1986, at A4 (picture caption).
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can be demonstrated, mternational law has several roadblocks to
recovery
First, what IS not clear under mternationallaw IS the applicable
standard for determmmg liability As discussed above, there are
three possible standards: (1) liability which must be predicated on
negligence, recklessness, or mtent10nal harm; (2) liability for an
unreasonable mterference With the natural resources of another
state; or (3) liability predicated on absolute liability or stnct liabilIty for ultrahazardous activities. Under the second and third standards, the state would be liable even if It was not the operator of
the reactor at which the acCident occurred. Second, the damages
that would be recoverable are even more uncertam. Under mter
national law damages are obtamable for loss of property and per
sonal InJUry Recovery for economic loss, however seems
somewhat less sure, as do damages for emotiOnal distress and
psychologiCal Impairment.
Third, the maJOr failing of mternatiOnal law m this area IS the
lack of means for actual enforcement. The pnmary means of enforcement would be m the domestic courts of the transgressor
state, but the availability of mternat10nal law m such forums
would depend on the extent to which the state mcorporates mter
national law mto Its own domestiC law and holds It to be enforceable. Enforcement would be hampered by many common
domestic bamers to JUnsdictiOn and enforcement, e.g. sovereign
1mmumty extra-terntonal enforcement, and standing. Though
the obvious forum, the InternatiOnal Court of Justice can only be
utilized by a state agamst a state and only If the defendant state
consents to JUnsdictiOn. The Soviet Umon has not consented to
JUrtsdictiOn m the InternatiOnal Court ofJusttce. In additiOn, deCistons of the InternatiOnal Court of Justice are only enforceable
by the Secunty Council of the Umted NatiOns, m which the Soviet
Umon has a veto. Other problems with current mternat10nallaw
exist. For example, there IS, at best, only an emergmg rule of
mternatiOnallaw that notificatiOn and exchange of mformat10n IS
reqmred m the event of an acCident that Imposes matenal damage
upon another state. Also, the pnmary treaty specifically governmg compensation for victims of a nuclear acCident Is the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage. Yet Its
usefulness IS hampered by limited partiCipation m the treaty
which does not mclude either the Umted States or the Soviet
Umon. As for mternatiOnal standards of safety for nuclear reac
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tors to prevent nuclear accidents, the IAEA only has the authonty
under Its statute to mspect nuclear reactors to msure that the InformatiOn and assistance provided by the agency are not bemg
1mproperly used for military purposes. Thus, the IAEA has no
present authonty to Impose any bmding safety standards.
What then would be the result if a European state attempted to
seek compensatiOn from the Soviet Umon for the agnculture
damage whiCh occurred from the Chernobyl accident? Under the
prmoples of mternat10nal law analyzed above what would be the
likely outcome of such a smt? Assummg that the Soviet Umon
would not voluntarily provide compensatiOn, successful recovery
IS very unlikely There Is no Issue of v1canous liability for the fallout damage because the Soviet Umon Is responsible directly as
the operator of the Chernobyl plant. The next, more trouble
some Issue would be the standards for liability As noted above,
state responsibility IS generally predicated on fault, I.e., mtentional wrongs, recklessness, or negligence. However It has been
argued that mternat10nal law recogmzes stnct liability for environmental harm based on ultrahazardous actiVIty The operatiOn
of a nuclear power plant should constitute an ultrahazardous ac
tivity m which the harm cannot be removed through reasonable
care. Fault standards are madequate to deal With the potential
hazards from complex technology The standards of care and
tests of forseeability become obscure and madequate when applied to the possible scope of a nuclear disaster Eqmty and economic analysis both pomt toward 1mposmg the burden of
compensatiOn on the nuclear mdustry and, ulumately on the
state as the parties best able to reduce nsk and absorb damages.
In attributmg to the state direct responsibility and stnct liability
the state has a direct mcentiVe to legislate and regulate to mmimize the nsk of the activity Limitations of causatiOn, force
maJeure, and dollar limitatiOns on recovery 210 are sufficient to assure that states will not be unduly burdened m such a way as to
hamper their discretiOn m developmg natiOnal energy resources.
It IS partiCularly appropnate m the mternat10nal context that
stnct liability should be recogmzed as the legal standard when
matenal and environmental harm results from ultrahazardous ac
tivities. Stnct liability for such harm avmds many of the problems
210. Most states have domesuc statutes lim1Ung the amount of recovery for nuclear
acCident. Congress 1s now recons1dermg the Pnce Anderson Act wh1ch sets lim1l of$665
million for smgle acCident. N.Y. Times, june 15, 1986, § 3 (Busmess) at 3, col. 3.
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assooated w1th fault standards m an mternat10nal settmg, such as
discernmg norms of conduct that are suffioently pervas1ve
around the globe to make 1t clear that dev1at10n below those
norms would constttute negligence. Havmg noted the difficulity
of developmg mternat10nally recogmzed defimt10ns of reasonable
care, however a relatively strong argument can be made that the
lack of a contamment structure and adequate backup system at
Chernobyl was negligent and would be so recogmzed almost umversally Some Western experts on nuclear technology have asserted that the Sov1et Umon has the worst nuclear safety plannmg
of any nation, even worse than that m developmg countnes and
the rest of the Sov1et block.2' 1
However even if we assume that It can be demonstrated m mtematiOnal law that the Sov1et Umon 1s liable for damages to
those countnes whtch suffered from radioactive fall-out, that liability may not bejudioally enforceable. The Sov1et Umon has not
consented to the JUnsdictlon of the InternatiOnal Court ofjust1ce.
Therefore a state s only opt10n for JUdioal enforcement would be
m 1ts own domestic courts or those of the Sov1et Umon where
procedural and JUrisdictiOnal obstacles, such as sovere1gn lmmumty standing and other obstacles previOusly discussed, would m
all likelihood prevail. In additiOn, linkmg death and disease m the
general population to the radioactive fall-out would present a difficult causatiOn 1ssue m any forum. Estimates of the number of
cancer deaths from the acc1dent, for example, vaned from 5,100
to 24,000. 212 And finally even if a state 1s successful on the mer
1ts m demonstratmg the damages, 1t 1s not at all clear what types
of damages would be recoverable. Damages to person and property would m all probability be recoverable. It 1s much less clear
whether damages for economiC loss and damages for pam and
suffenng could be recovered. To illustrate, Welsh farmers as late
as August were unable to take the1r lambs to slaughter because of
a government ban on sale of the lambs exposed to Chemobyl's
radiat10n. 213 Was the damage sustamed property damage, wh1ch
would be recoverable, or economic loss, wh1ch would not be re
coverable? Arguably if the lambs were actually contammated
there would be property damage, but if the ban was purely precautionary there would only be econom1c loss. Viewed as an 1ssue
211. N.Y. Times, May I, 1986, at Al2, col. l.
212. N.Y. Times, Aug. 7 1986, at AI, col. 6.
213. N.Y. Times, july 3, 1986, at AI, col. 2.
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of causation, alternatively It would be the state government, not
the radiatiOn from the accident, that caused the loss. Certamly
that IS why the Soviet Umon stated that the damage to agnculture
was the result of government and media overreactiOn and not the
accident Itself. However if viewed as a rule of causatiOn rather
than an arbitrary distmction m damages recoverable, It could be
argued that such government quarantmes are reasonably forsee
able as a result of an acodent such as Chernobyl.
The difficulty under mternatwnal law m obtammg compensation from the Soviet Umon m what IS a relatively straightforward
SituatiOn of state responsibility for radioactive contammatwn
highlights the madequaoes of customary mternatwnallaw m addressmg state responsibility for transboundary pollution. To proVIde more adequate protectiOn from future "Chernobyls" than
that which presently exists, several relatively straightforward re
forms should be made Immediately m the aftermath of accident's
condemnatiOn. To avmd another accident like that at Chernobyl,
efforts should be made by bilateral agreements between the IAEA
and states to expand mspections by the IAEA to mclude safety
mspections. Twenty-one countnes now have such agreements,
and there are some mdicatwns of willingness on the part of the
Soviet Umon to enter mto such an agreement. Extensive efforts
should be made to mcrease adherence to the Vienna Convention
on Compensation for Nuclear Damage. Because the most likely
and most senous forms of damage from an acctdent ts agncultural
damage, consideratiOn should be given to exemptmg such losses
from the general prohibitiOn agamst recovery of economiC loss.
Hopefully under the auspiCes of the IAEA, a treaty will be
promulgated providing for notification and exchange of mformahon m the event of nuclear accidents threatemng mternatwnal
environmental harm. Such a treaty should mclude military reac
tors as well as ovilian reactors, as there IS no difference m the
environmental harm and It 1s unlikely that any such reqmrement
wouldjeopardize any states natwnal secunty There should be a
specific defimuon of what types of accidents would qualify for reportmg restnctions m order to avmd the very likely possibility of
states makmg their own unilateral and self-servmg determmauon
of what accidents should be reported.
There IS presently no treaty whtch generally governs environmental protection of global resources. Such a treaty could mcor
porate current standards of protectwn m custom and general

1987]

Chemoby1

241

pnnCiples of mtemat10nallaw while strengthemng their enforceability by providing for mcorporat10n of those standards mto the
domestic law of the treaty s signatones, and by providing for International arbitration m adjudication of trans boundary pollution
claims. Such a treaty might also reqmre notification and mternatiOnal consultation before development of any proJect posmg an
Immment, transboundary threat of environmental damage.
The present time presents a umque opportumty to actually Implement many of these suggestions, if for no other reason than
that the Soviet Umon and the Umted States are trymg to outdo
each other m argumg that somethmg must be done. In September Soviet offiCials announced that entombment of the fourth re
actor at Chemobyl was on schedule, and that the first and second
reactors would resume operation m November 214 In August, nuclear experts had already expressed concern w1th the Sov1et
Umon s new safety plans for Chemobyl-type reactors. 215 The
IAEA proJects that by the year 2000, slightly more than half of the
countnes With nuclear power plants will be the less technologically advanced, developmg countnes. 216 The toxic destructiOn of
Bhopal, the tragedy of the Challenger shuttle, and the accident at
Chemobyl should serve as strikmg remmders that technology
cannot regulate Itself. We are m the technologtcal space age, yet
mtemat10nal environmental regulation IS still pnmitive. We can
and do make mistakes, and we must be prepared as a global commumty to handle the consequences.

214. N.Y. Times, Sepl. 16, 1986, at A5, col. 4.
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